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IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

]

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
i
i
;

FREDERICK JOSEPH GERMONTO,
Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 900375
Priority No. 2

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT
INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to this Court's Order of February 3, 1992,
Appellant's alternative counsel files this Supplemental Brief to
be considered in addition to the brief filed by Salt Lake Legal
Defender Association (LDA), and the pro se brief filed by the
Appellant, Frederick Joseph Germonto.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann.
§78-2-2(3)(i) (1992) which grants original appellate jurisdiction
to the Utah Supreme Court over appeals in criminal cases from the
district court "involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony . . . ."

The defendant, Mr. Germonto, was convicted of

second degree homicide, a first degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203.
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The following issues are presented in this brief for
review:
1.

Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion

to dismiss the robbery charge at the end of the State's case
because there was no taking by force or fear as required by the
statute?

If the defendant's motion to dismiss was correctly

denied/ then was the robbery conviction supported by sufficient
evidence?
2.

Were defendant's trial counsel ineffective because

they (a) failed to object to questions and arguments by the
prosecutor which improperly used information subject to the
attorney-client privilege and amounted to improper comment on Mr.
Germonto's right to remain silent and (b) failed to adequately
present the defense of voluntary intoxication?
A defendant's motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the
State's case in chief requires a trial court to determine whether
the defendant must proceed with the introduction of evidence in
his defense.

State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521, 524 (Utah 1983).

In

order to survive a motion to dismiss the prosecution must
establish a prima facie case.
(Utah 1976).

State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 217

That means the prosecution must present some

evidence of every element needed to make out a cause of action.
State v. Noren, 704 P.2d 568, 570 (Utah 1985).
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Insufficiency of evidence claims require an appellate
court to review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict.

State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989).

If the

evidence is so inconclusive that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, the
appellate court must reverse the conviction.

State v. Moore, 802

P.2d 732, 738 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
With respect to the second issue presented, an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim presents a mixed question
of law and fact.

State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990);

State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487, (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

Where

no claim of ineffectiveness has been presented to the trial court,
an appellate court may review the record to determine on appeal
whether counselfs performance constituted ineffective assistance
as a matter of law.

Government of the Virgin Islands v. Zepp,

748 F.2d 125, 133-34 (3rd Cir 1984); Johnson, 823 P.2d at 487.
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Any statutes, rules or constitutional provisions relevant
to the disposition of this appeal are set forth in the text of
this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Frederick Joseph Germonto was convicted by a jury on May
8, 1990, of murder in the second degree, a first degree felony, in
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violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203 (1990); robbery, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-301 (1990);
and forgery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §76-5-501 (1990).

The trial court subsequently sentenced Mr.

Germonto- to a term of five years to life for homicide, to run
consecutively with two concurrent terms of one to fifteen years
for each of the second degree felonies.

(R. 285-90)

Mr. Germonto

had been represented at the trial by attorneys from the Salt Lake
Legal Defender Association.

(R. 17-18)

The Salt Lake Legal Defender Association filed an opening
brief on behalf of Mr. Germonto raising five issues.

Several

months thereafter, Mr. Germonto filed his own "supplementary
brief" which added six more issues including ineffective assistance of counsel on the part of the trial attorneys from LDA.
The State subsequently moved to strike Mr. Germonto's
pro se brief.

However, in an order issued on February 3, 1992,

this Court denied the State's motion to strike Mr. Germonto's
brief but the Court "advised" LDA to withdraw as Mr. Germonto1s
counsel and allow "alternative" counsel to represent him.
Alternative counsel was ordered to "examine and evaluate" the
briefs already filed on Mr. Germontofs behalf and "to file any
additional briefing."
A.)

(The court's order is attached as Addendum

In accord with the order, Mr. Germonto's alternative counsel

files this supplemental brief to be considered with the two briefs
already filed.1

!Mr. Germonto has requested that his brief not be withdrawn.
-4-

In

FACTS
The facts are adequately set forth in the opening brief
filed by the LDA and will not be repeated here except where
supplementation is necessary to clarify the issues raised by this
brief.2
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Mr. Germonto contends that the trial court should have
dismissed the robbery charge at the conclusion of the State's
case.

In the alternative, Mr. Germonto asserts that the robbery

conviction is supported by insufficient evidence.

In either case,

there is no evidence that a taking was accomplished by force or
fear as required by the statute because the victim was
unconscious, and perhaps dead, when Mr. Germonto formed the intent
to take certain items.
Mr. Germonto contends that his trial attorneys were
ineffective.

The attorneys failed to object to the prosecutor's

reference during cross-examination and in closing argument to a
confidential communication between Mr. Germonto and his attorneys.

consideration of this request and the validity of the issues
raised by LDA in its opening brief and the investigation conducted
by alternative counsel, alternative counsel has chosen to file
this additional supplemental brief rather than withdraw either or
both of the preceding briefs.
2

In order to promote clarity and prevent confusion, this brief
adopts the record numbering system contained in the opening brief
of LDA. Brief of Appellant at v. In that system the following
enumeration of the various transcripts is used:
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Furthermore, the attorneys failed to object to the prosecutor's
references to Mr. Germonto's post-arrest/pre-trial silence.
Furthermore, even though Mr.

Germonto testified that he was under

the influence of drugs at the time of the killing, his attorneys
failed to develop or request instructions concerning the defense
of voluntary intoxication.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ROBBERY CHARGE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED
BY THE TRIAL COURT BECAUSE THE PROSECUTION
FAILED TO PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE
ROBBERY WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY MEANS OF FORCE
OR FEAR. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE ROBBERY
CONVICTION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.

District Court pleadings file . . . R.
Preliminary Hearing transcript 7/19/89 . . . P.H.
Motion transcript 10/31/89 (Misdated on cover sheet 10/31/90)
(R. 310) . . . M.l
Motion transcript 11/13/89 (R. 314)

. . M.2

Motion transcript 11/20/89 (R. 315)

. . M.3

Motion transcript 12/29/89 (R. 316)

. . M.4

Motion transcript 1/30/90 (R. 311)

. M.5

Motion transcript 2/2/90 (R.313)

M.6

Trial transcript 5/1/90 (R. 305)

T.l

Trial transcript 5/2/90 (R. 306)

T.2

Trial transcript 5/3/90 (R. 307)

T.3

Trial transcript 5/4/90 (R. 309)

T.4

Trial transcript 5/8/90 (R. 308)

T.5
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At the end of the State's case, Mr. Germonto's counsel
moved to dismiss all the charges, including the robbery charge
based on the lack of evidence to support the various charges and
the lack of intent.

(T.4 at 106)

The trial court subsequently

denied the defense motion to dismiss.
Mr. Germonto was convicted of robbery.

(T.4 at 109)
(R. 275)

Ultimately,

However, as will

be argued below, the robbery charge was unsupported by the evidence and as a matter of law, a robbery was not proven because the
prosecution failed to establish all of the necessary elements.

In

order for a charge in a criminal case to be submitted to the jury,
"it is necessary that the prosecution present some evidence of
every element needed to make out a cause of action."
Noren, 704 P.2d 568, 570 (Utah 1985).

State v.

Therefore, Mr. Germonto

argues that either the trial court should have dismissed the robbery charge at the end of the State's case or the conviction is
unsupported.

In any event, the charge should have never been sub-

mitted to the jury because of the prosecution's failure to prove
all of the elements.
Mr. Germonto was charged and convicted of robbery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-301
(1990).

That provision states:
(1) Robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking of personal property in the possession of
another from his person or immediate presence,
against his will, accomplished by means of force
or fear.

While the prosecution adduced evidence during its case in chief
that Mr. Germonto had taken items that belonged to Mr. Lisonbee,
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it presented no evidence that the items were taken by force or
fear as required by the statute.
At trial, the prosecution presented evidence which indicated that an individual who had visited Mr. Lisonbee earlier in
the morning noticed that Mr. Lisonbee was wearing the ring which
Mr. Germonto ultimately stated that he took.

(T.2 at 45) Mr.

Germonto admitted taking the ring, although he stated that the
ring was not on Mr. Lisonbeefs hand when he took it, and Mr.
Lisonbee1s checkbook, but denied taking Mr. Lisonbee's wallet.
(T.4 at 150, 206-08)

The State adduced no evidence that Mr.

Germonto went to Mr. Lisonbee1s home on January 9, 1988, with the
intention of hurting or taking anything from Mr. Lisonbee.
In responding to the defense motion to dismiss the robbery charge, the prosecutor stated that the robbery charge should
not be dismissed because:
As far as robbery is concerned, I think the
evidence is clear that at or about the time that
Mr. Lisonbee died, there were items taken from
his — presumably — inferentially from his body.
The evidence at the scene would indicate that
there were rooms gone through and a check book
was taken. We have recovered that check book,
and I think we have tied that to the defendant.
(T.4 at 108)

The prosecution presented no evidence which demon-

strated that Mr. Germonto fulfilled the statutory elements of robbery by taking the ring and/or check book from "the person or
immediate presence" of Mr. Lisonbee "against his will" "by means
of force or fear."

-8-

Mr. Germonto, the only witness to the events, categorically denied that he went to Mr. Lisonbeefs house on the day in
question to take anything.

(T.4 at 159)

Mr. Germonto testified

that he went to Mr. Lisonbee's house to seek assistance in renting
an apartment because he knew that Mr.
(T.4 at 132)

Lisonbee was a landlord.

Mr. Germonto testified that after arriving at Mr.

Lisonbee's house on January 9, 1988, he talked with Mr.
and then volunteered to repair Mr.

Lisonbee

Lisonbee1s broken toilet.

(T.4 at 135-36) Mr. Lisonbee apparently noticed that Mr. Germonto
was acting erratically and asked if he were taking drugs.
137)

(T.4 at

When Mr. Germonto replied that he had taken some "weird

speed" that morning, Mr.

Lisonbee abruptly left the bathroom

where Mr. Germonto was working.

(T.4 at 138)

Mr. Germonto testi-

fied that when he followed Mr. Lisonbee intending to assuage Mr.
Lisonbee's concern about the drugs, he found Mr. Lisonbee with a
large knife in his hand.

(T.4 at 138)

Mr. Lisonbee yelled at Mr.

Germonto, cut Mr. Germonto1s hand with the knife, and pushed him
to the ground.
and, when Mr.

(T.4 at 140-41) Mr. Germonto got back on his feet
Lisonbee insisted that he leave, stated that he

would if he could just get his coat. (T.4 at 14 3) Mr. Germonto
testified that Mr.
at 143-44)

Lisonbee approached him with the knife.

(T.4

Mr. Germonto testified that as Mr. Lisonbee approached

him with the knife he became fearful and hit Mr. Lisonbee with the
wrench he had been using to repair the toilet.

(T.4 at 144-45)

Mr. Germonto said that he subsequently lost consciousness
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and did not remember the events which followed but it must be
assumed that during this time Mr. Lisonbee was beaten by Mr.
Germonto.

(T.4 at 146)

The next thing that Mr. Germonto remem-

bers was regaining consciousness with Mr. Lisonbee lying on the
living room floor, bleeding and unmoving.
was in disarray.

(T.4 at 146)

The house

(T.4 at 146) At this point, Mr. Germonto testi-

fied that he began to realize the gravity of his actions.
148)

(T.4 at

He took the knife which was lying beside Mr. Lisonbee into

the kitchen so that Lisonbee could not get up and "get" him.

(T.4

at 147) Mr. Germonto next described running into the bathroom to
wash his bleeding hand and then returning to the living room.
(T.4 at 148)

Mr. Germonto then removed bedding and covered Mr.

Lisonbee with it.

(T.4 at 149)

Next, Mr. Germonto testified that

he attempted to change into a pair of Mr. Lisonbeefs pants but
discovered that they were too long.

(T.4 at 150)

It was only at

this point that Mr. Germonto stated that he took a ring and a
check book which he testified he saw lying on the counter as he
was on his way out of the house.

(T.4 at 150)

Mr. Germonto tes-

tified that he took the items because he needed to buy a bus
ticket to leave town.

(T.4 at 151)

Later Mr. Germonto wrote one

of Mr. Lisonbee's checks to himself for $27 3.00 and eventually
cashed that check.

(T.4 at 152-58)

During closing argument the

prosecution argued that Mr. Germonto should be found guilty of
robbery because "he robbed Mr.

Lisonbee after he killed him...."

(T.5 at 46)
The Utah robbery statute requires that the taking be
accomplished by the use of force or fear.
-10-

However, if a victim is

dead, no force or fear is used in the taking.

This Court has

apparently never addressed the issue of whether a person who has
been murdered can subsequently be robbed.

However, several courts

in other states have addressed this question with differing
results.

Mr. Germonto now argues that because of the phrasing of

the Utah robbery statute, if an individual has been murdered without an intent by the perpetrator to facilitate a robbery, then a
subsequent taking of the victim's belongings by the perpetrator
cannot be a robbery.

The crimes committed by the perpetrator

amount to a homicide and a theft, but not a homicide and a
robbery.

Robbery can only be accomplished subsequent to the homi-

cide if the homicide was perpetrated in order to promote the
taking.
In People v. Tiller, 447 N.E.2d 174 (111. 1982), the
Illinois Supreme Court held that a defendant could not be held
accountable for the armed robbery of a homicide victim because the
force directed against the victim was not for the purpose of
obtaining property from her through force or intimidation as
required by the robbery statute.

Rather, the evidence indicated

that the initial force against the victim was to prevent her from
identifying the defendant as her assailant.

447 N.E.2d at 180-81.

The court stated:
To sustain a charge of armed robbery it is
essential that the robber use violence or fear of
violence as the means to take property in the
control of the victim.
The evidence does not show beyond a reasonable doubt that the violence exerted in this case
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was used as a means to take [property from the
homicide victim]. A more severe penalty is
imposed for robbery than for theft because a
great danger exists that the robber's threat of
force or violence will lead to death or great
bodily harm. Taking advantage of an existing
threat, where that threat was not delivered to
persuade the victim to release control of
property, creates no additional danger of great
bodily harm.
447 N.E.2d at 181. The court concluded that the use of force
against the victim was for a purpose other than to take property
from her and thus, the defendant could not be convicted of
robbery.

See also People v. Pack, 341 N.E.2d 4 (111. Ct. App.

1976) ("Force was used against the victim with the intent to kill,
not to steal.

The subsequent taking of property, apparently an

afterthought, established only theft ... .")
In Branch v. Commonwealth, 300 S.E.2d 758 (Va. 1983), the
defendant had attempted to mediate a conflict which had arisen
during a drinking party at his house.

300 S.E.2d at 759.

However, when one of the combatants spurned the defendant's offer
of compromise, the defendant pointed a gun at the victim and
killed the victim.

The victim was then dragged into a bedroom and

wrapped in a blanket.

The defendant went through the victim's

pockets and removed a wallet containing identification cards.

The

defendant was convicted of homicide, robbery, and the use of a
firearm in the commission of a felony.

300 S.E.2d at 758.

In the

Virginia Supreme Court, the defendant argued that the evidence was
insufficient to establish that the intent to steal the wallet was
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contemporaneous with the shooting.

The Commonwealth argued that

the precise sequence of events or lapse of time between the homicide and the robbery was unimportant so long as "all of the elements necessary to show robbery . . . are present."
at 759.

300 S.E.2d

In prior cases, the court had held that it "must look to

the intention as it existed at the time of the taking rather than
to its formation subsequently."

300 S.E.2d at 760, quoting Jones

v. Commonwealth, 1 S.E.2d 300, 302 (Va. 1939).

The court then

stated:
The principal elements of robbery, a crime
against the person of the victim are the taking,
the intent to steal, and the violence (or
intimidation). Definitionally, there is a temporal correlation among these elements. The violence must occur before or at the time of the
taking. The intent to steal and the taking must
coexist. And the offense is not robbery unless
the animus furandi was conceived before or at the
time the violence was committed.

Here, . . . the question is whether robbery
was the motive for the killing. [The defendant's]
conduct, both before and after the killing,
negates any inference that he had conceived an
intent to rob at the time he shot his victim.
300 S.E.2d at 759-60.

Because the defendant possessed no intent

to steal at the moment he shot the victim, the court held that the
evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support the
defendant's conviction of robbery.

300 S.E.2d at 760.

Finally, in State v. Lopez, 762 P.2d 545 (Ariz. 1988),
the defendant asserted that the taking of a homicide victim's car
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and billfold could not constitute "armed robbery" because the
items were taken after the victimfs death and there was no
evidence that the earlier use of force against the victim was
accompanied by an intent to commit a robbery.

762 P.2d at 550.

The Arizona Supreme Court held that the evidence must establish
that the defendant's intent to commit robbery coexisted with use
of force against the victim.

Id.

Because no evidence demon-

strated that the defendant's use of force was intended to coerce
the victim to surrender either of the items which were ultimately
taken, the court held the defendant could not be found guilty of
robbery.

762 P.2d at 551. See also State v. Wallace, 728 P.2d

232, 235 (Ariz.

1986) ("

to establish a factual basis for

[armed robbery], it must be shown that defendant (1) while armed
with a deadly weapon, (2) took property from another person
against that person's will, and (3) in the course of taking the
property, defendant threatened or used force against that person
with the intent to deprive them of their property.")
This Court has previously held that the use of force must
be "concurrent or concomitant with the taking" to constitute a
robbery.

State v. Ulibarri, 668 P.2d 568, 569 (Utah 1983).

Clearly, a more severe penalty is imposed for robbery than for
theft because a robber's threat of force or violence poses a
greater danger to a victim than does a simple theft. Therefore,
only the theft of items of great value merits punishment as a second degree felony.

Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412(1)(a)
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On the other

hand a robbery involving the taking of an item of any value merits
at least the punishment of a second degree felony.
§76-6-301(2)

A robbery in which a weapon is used or which results

in injury is punished even more severely.
§76-6-302(2)

Utah Code Ann.

Utah Code Ann.

This reveals a legislative focus on the danger

involved in robbery crimes.

In a case such as this, where the

victim is either unconscious or already dead at the time the taking occurs and the force previously used against the victim was
not intended to promote the taking of the property, the concern
posed by robbery is not present.

A robbery has not been committed

if the taking is merely an afterthought.
In this case, the evidence revealed that Mr. Germonto had
already killed Mr. Lisonbee before he formulated the intent to
take Mr. Lisonbee's check book and ring.

There was no evidence to

indicate that force was directed against Mr. Lisonbee to promote a
taking.

Indeed, even the prosecutor argued that the items were

taken after Mr. Lisonbee was unconscious or dead.

(T.5 at 46)

Therefore, the essential element of a taking accomplished by force
or fear is simply not present.

Mr. Germonto should not have been

convicted of robbery and indeed, the case should not have gone to
the jury because the trial court should have granted the defense
motion to dismiss the charge.
Additionally, because the robbery conviction was unsupported by the evidence but could have formed the basis for the
second degree homicide conviction, that conviction should also be
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set aside.

If the jury opted to find Mr. Germonto guilty of sec-

ond degree murder under the felony murder option submitted to
them, then because there was no legal basis for the robbery
conviction, the second degree homicide conviction should also
fail. See Brief of Appellant submitted by LDA at 9-12.
POINT II
MR. GERMONTO'S TRIAL COUNSEL WERE INEFFECTIVE
BECAUSE THEY FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE
PROSECUTORfS IMPROPER REFERENCES TO
CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS AND MR. GERMONTOfS
PRETRIAL SILENCE AND BECAUSE THEY FAILED TO
PRESENT THE DEFENSE OF VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION.
Ordinarily, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
are addressed by collateral attack in habeas corpus proceedings;
however, in some circumstances the claims may be raised on diresct
appeal.

State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 (Utah Ct. App 1991).

Such circumstances exist when the defendant is represented by new
counsel on appeal and the trial record is adequate on the issues.
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 133-34
(3rd Cir 1984).

The circumstances are present for this Court to

review the ineffectiveness claim raised in this case on direct
appeal.
In cases involving ineffectiveness claims, Utah courts
have adopted the two-part test of Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1984):
First, the defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient. This requires showing
that counsel made errors so serious that counsel
was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed
the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second,
the defendant must show that the deficient per-
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formance prejudiced the defense• This requires
showing that counsel's errors were so serious as
to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
whose result is reliable.
See also State v. Tempiin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990).

In

short, to demonstrate ineffectiveness, the defendant must demonstrate deficient performance which resulted in prejudice.
A. Mr. Germonto's Trial Counsel Should Have Objected to the
Prosecutor's Improper Use of Mr. Germonto's Pretrial Silence and
The Prosecutor's Reference to Privileged Attorney-Client
Communications.
At the end of the motion hearing held on January 30,
1990, approximately one week before the scheduled beginning of the
trial, Mr. Germonto indicated to the court that he had some
written information to present to the court.

(M.5 at 10) The

trial judge suggested that defense counsel examine the information
first.

After a recess, defense counsel indicated that there was

no need to present the information to the trial court.
10)

(M.5 at

Defense counsel soon filed a motion for a continuance

alleging that they were made aware of new information by the
written communication of January 30, 1990, and that it would be
impossible for them to be prepared to go to trial on the scheduled
date because the entire posture of the case had changed.

(R. 115)

At a hearing on this motion on February 2, 1990, defense counsel
related the following:
That information [of January 30] totally,
totally and completely changes our defense in
this case. Totally changes the focus from one
thing to another.

-17-

We have previously subpoenaed something in
the area of eighteen or nineteen witnesses. We
have done significant investigation, significant
preparation, and were planning to, and prepared
to go forward this coming Tuesday with the
defense that we had previously prepared.
Because of the new information that became
available to us, that defense, frankly, got
thrown out the window, and we have a new defense
which is going to require investigation, and
very probably psychological evaluation of Mr.
Germonto . . . .
(M.6 at 3-4)

Even though he had not read it, the prosecutor also

acknowledged the surprising nature of the written information
provided by Mr. Germonto and characterized it as "a bomb shell."
The trial court granted the defense's continuance.

(M.6 at 6)

At trial, the prosecutor established that Mr. Germonto
had reviewed the police reports in the case and implied that he
had contrived the story given during his testimony to fit the
evidence contained in the police reports.

(T.4 at 195-96, 208)

The prosecutor asked Mr. Germonto: "When did you first tell anybody about this, 'he-attacked-me-with-a-knife' part of the story?"
(T.4 at 226)

Mr. Germonto explained that it occurred after a

period of religious meditation and that he had written a letter to
his attorney which was directed to the trial judge explaining all
of the things about which he had testified.

(T.4 at 226)

prosecutor then asked when that letter was written; Mr.
replied a couple of months prior to trial.

The

Germonto

(T.4 at 227) After the

prosecutor mistakenly identified the date of the letter as
February, 1990, the prosecutor asked: "When were you arrested for
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this offense?"

(T.4 at 227)

Mr. Germonto replied that he had

been arrested a year before the trial.

Defense counsel made no

objection to this exchange between the prosecutor and Mr.
Germonto.
In closing argument, the prosecutor argued:
Just as Germonto didn't even come up with selfdefense until four months ago, he didn't even tell
his attorneys until then. And he came up with
that after he had had an opportunity to read all
of the police reports about what was found where,
and who said what. A number of police reports.
He knew what the scene looked like in those
reports. He didn't even talk about self-defense
until four months ago. Before that this case was
a who-done-it? It is not at this point, because
of something he has come up with in just the last
little while.

I would submit to you that the defendant's
testimony reveals a man who has had an opportunity
to read the police reports, and he is intelligent.
I don't know very many people who have gone to
college at the age of 14. And I would submit to
you that in the time from his arrest on this
offense that the testified, that he fashioned a
story that he thinks covers the bases. It covers
the bases with regard to the offense and selfdefense, that's all he ever told you was selfdefense. And he did not fashion this story or
communicate it to any one, including his attorney,
until February of [1990]. Some eight months after
his arrest for these offenses.
(T.5 at 31-34)

Again, no objection was made by defense counsel to

the prosecutor's comments.
Mr. Germonto's counsel should have objected not only on
the basis of the breach of the attorney-client privilege but also
because the prosecutor's question and argument amounted to
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improper comment on the defendant's right to remain silent after
his arrest.

The LDA brief raises the issue of the prosecutor's

breach of the attorney-client privilege in the context of plain
error at pages 22-27 but does not address the issue of the
defendant's right to remain silent.
While the current Rule of Evidence, Rule 504, was inapplicable at the time of the defendant's trial, it is nevertheless
instructive with regard to the scope of the attorney-client
privilege.

That rule states:

(a)

Definitions

(5) A "communication" includes advice given by
the lawyer in the course of representing the
client and includes disclosures of the client
and the client's representatives to the lawyer
or the lawyer's representative incidental to the
professional relationship.
(6) A communication is "confidential" if not
intended to be disclosed to third persons other
than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance
of the rendition of professional legal services
to the client or those reasonably necessary for
the transmission of the communication.
(b) General Rule of Privilege. A client has
the privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of
facilitating the rendition of professional legal
services to the client between the client and
the client's representatives, lawyers, lawyers'
representatives, and lawyers' representing matters of common interest, and among the client's
representatives, lawyers, lawyers'
representatives, and lawyers representing others
in matters of common interest, in any
combination.
The attorney-client privilege belongs to the client and concerns
communication between the attorney and the client.
-20-

The reason for

the privilege is not to protect the client, but to foster free and
open exchange of information between the attorney and the client.
State v. Alexander, 503 P.2d 777 (Ariz. 1972).
The defendant in a criminal case does not waive the
attorney-client privilege when he takes the stand to testify in
his own behalf.

As the New York Court of Appeals noted in People

v. Shapiro, 308 N.Y. 453, 459, 126 N.E. 2d 559, 562 (1955):
To say that the broad protection of [the attorneyclient privilege] is not available to a defendant
when he takes the stand in a criminal case would
entail consequences far more detrimental to the
interest of society than does the rejection of the
evidence that might be disclosed. When the
client, especially one accused of crimes, asks for
advice and guidance the premises, he should be
able to speak freely without any fear and in full
confidence that what is said by him or to him by
his attorney will not be subsequently subject to
disclosure if he takes the witness stand during
the trial of his case. Any other policy than
strict inviolability, unless expressly waived, would
seriously hamper the administration of justice, so
the client would perhaps refrain from telling the
truth or withhold the truth, while the lawyer
would be reluctant to give the correct advice and
counsel if he thought it would be subject to disclosure in the event his client took the stand to
testify in his own behalf.
In State v. Holsinger, 601 P.2d 1054 (Ariz. 1979), the
Arizona Supreme Court reversed a first degree homicide conviction
because certain questions asked by the prosecutor on cross-examination of the defendant improperly infringed on the attorneyclient privilege and thereby prejudiced her in the eyes of the
jury.

601 P.2d at 1058-59.

Specifically, the prosecutor asked

the defendant questions concerning the number of times she had had
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conversations with her attorneys concerning the case and whether
she had ever discussed the content of the state's case against
her with her attorneys.

601 P.2d at 1058.

The court held that

the prosecutor's question was prejudicial to the defendant's case.
601 P.2d at 1059.
The attorney-client privilege belongs to the client;
however, because of his or her training and experience, it is the
duty of the attorney to know when invocation of the privilege is
proper.

In this case, defense counsel made no objection to the

prosecutor's initial inquiry to Mr. Germonto regarding the fact
that Mr. Germonto had only recently disclosed new facts in a
letter to his lawyer.

The prosecutor exposed to the jurors

matters that should have been protected by the attorney-client
privilege because the letter in question was a privileged
communication between Mr. Germonto and his attorney.

Counsel's

failure to object to the prosecutor's use of the letter during
questioning was deficient performance.

Furthermore, defense

counsel failed to object when the issue was against raised during
the prosecutor's closing argument.

In that argument, the

prosecutor disclosed the content of communication between Mr.
Germonto and his attorneys both prior to the letter and after the
letter.

Yet no objection was raised.

The failure to object was

deficient performance by Mr. Germonto's counsel.
Counsels' deficient performance prejudiced Mr. Germonto's
case.

Because of counsels' failure to object, Mr. Germonto was
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shown to be a less credible witness.

This case hinged on the

credibility of Mr. Germonto as perceived by the jury.

In essence,

the jury was told that if Mr. Germonto would not tell the truth to
his own defense attorneys until a few months prior to trial, he
should not be viewed as credible during his testimony to the jury.
Counsels' failure to object clearly impugned Mr. Germonto's
testimony.
The prosecutor's comments also amounted to improper
comment on Mr. Germonto's post-arrest silence.

Doyle v. Ohio, 426

U.S. 610 (1976), presents a similar fact situation.

In Doyle the

defendant presented a plausible explanation at trial for his
allegedly criminal activity.

426 U.S. at 613.

The prosecutor

attempted to impeach the defendant's exculpatory story by asking
why the defendant had failed to raise the story after his arrest.
The State contended that the need to present the jury all
information relative to the truth of the petitioner's exculpatory
story fully justified the cross-examination concerning the
defendant's prior failure to present the story.

In holding that

such cross-examination violates a defendant's right to due
process, the United States Supreme Court stated that while the
Miranda warnings issued when an individual is arrested contain no
"express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such
assurance is implicit to any person who receives warnings."
U.S. at 618.

The Court also stated that

426

,f

[i]n such circumstances,

it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process
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to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an
explanation subsequently offered at trial."

426 U.S. at 618.

In State v. Wiswell, 639 P.2d 146 (Utah 1981), this Court
considered a case in which questions concerning the defendant's
post-arrest silence were posed to the police officer who arrested
the defendant and during the prosecutor's closing argument.

639

P.2d at 147. After stating that Doyle was controlling on the
issue, this Court stated:
The continued attempts by the prosecutor to put
the defendant's silence before the jury after his
having been advised of his right to remain silent
amounts to prosecutorial misconduct.
The references to defendant's silence are
fundamental error, which could have affected the
result and are therefore prejudicial.
639 P.2d at 147.
In this case, the prosecutor's cross-examination and
argument concerning Mr. Germonto's trial defense directly raised
the fact that Mr. Germonto had remained silent immediately
following his arrest and up to a few months prior to trial.
Defense counsel failed to object to any of the questions or
arguments raised by the prosecutor.
In Wiswell this Court stated that references to
defendant's silence are "fundamental" error.

If such references

are fundamental error, then defense counsels' failure to object
cannot be considered a tactical strategy and must be considered
deficient performance.

Mr. Germonto was prejudiced by his
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counsels1 deficiency because without improper references the jury
would not have heard testimony concerning the defendant's postarrest silence.

As the Supreme Court stated in Doyle, bringing

such information to the jury's attention is a violation of due
process and should not have been allowed in this case.
B. Defense Counsel Were Ineffective Because They Failed to
Present the Defense of Voluntary Intoxication.
During the course of his testimony, Mr. Germonto indicated that he had taken some "weird speed" a couple of hours prior
to visiting Mr. Lisonbee.

(T.4 at 137)

Mr. Germonto testified

that he had no recollection of what occurred during the scuffle
which resulted in Mr. Lisonbee's death.

In essence, Mr. Germonto

testified to a defense of voluntary intoxication.

However,

defense counsel did nothing to pursue this defense.

No expert

witnesses were called concerning the potential effects of speed
and whether Mr. Germonto's testimony concerning a blackout was
reasonable and could have resulted from the drug.

Defense counsel

offered no jury instruction concerning the defense of voluntary
intoxication.

These failures constituted deficient performance on

the part of defense counsel.
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-306 (1990) defines the defense of
involuntary intoxication:
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense
to a criminal charge unless such intoxication
negates the existence of the mental state which is
an element of the offense; however, if recklessness or criminal negligence establishes an element
of an offense and the actor is unaware of the risk
because of voluntary intoxication, his unawareness
is immaterial in the prosecution of that offense.
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Voluntary intoxication does not absolve a person from all criminal
liability, it merely serves to negate a culpable mental state
and reduce the level of liability.

State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d

254, 265-66 (Utah 1988); State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 89 (Utah),
cert denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982).

If the voluntary intoxication

is so great that the defendant's mind has been affected to such an
extent that he did not have the capacity to form the requisite
specific intent or purpose to commit the crime charged then the
crime is reduced.

Wood, 648 P.2d at 89.

In this case, Mr. Germonto testified that his mind had
been affected by the drug.

(T.4 at 130-31)

The promulgation of

the voluntary intoxication defense was not incompatible with the
self-defense asserted by Mr. Germontofs attorneys. However,
because counsel failed to pursue the defense either by calling
expert witnesses to testify to the validity of the defense or by
requesting instructions which would have put the issue before the
jury, Mr. Germonto was deprived of a viable defense.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and the preceding briefs
filed by Salt Lake Legal Defender Association and Frederick Joseph
Germonto, the defendant, Frederick Joseph Germonto, requests that
this Court reverse his convictions and remand the case for a new

-26-

trial or, on the robbery charge, dismissal of the charge.
Respectfully submitted this J-"

day of September, 1992,

NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT

CURTIS C. NESSET
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of
this brief were delivered to the Office of the Attorney General,
2 36 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, this
1992.
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day of September,
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Attorneys at Law
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Frederick Joseph Germonto,
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ORDER
1.

Motion to Strike Pro-se Brief is denied.

2.

Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association is advised to
withdraw as defendant's counsel to represent
counsel and allow alternative counsel to represent
defendant.

3.

Alternative counsel is granted 4 5 days after
appearance to examine and evaluate briefs and to
file any additional briefing.

4.

Thereafter, the State shall have 30 days to file
appellee's brief.
Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

DOCKETING STATEMENT
Subject to Assignment to the
Court of Appeals

v.
FREDRICK JOSEPH GERMONTO,

Case No. 900375
Priority No. 2

De fendant/Appe11ant.

1.

Pursuant to Rule 9 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure,

Appellant files the following Docketing Statement.
2.

Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to

Rule 26(2)(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1989) and Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (1953 as amended), whereby the defendant in a
criminal action may take an appeal to the Supreme Court from a final
judgment and conviction for a first degree felony.

In this case,

final judgment and conviction was rendered by the Honorable
Raymond S. Uno, Judge, Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah.
3.

This appeal is from a judgment and conviction for

Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree, a felony of the
first degree, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1953 as
amended); Robbery, a felony of the second degree, in violation of

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1953 as amended); and Forgery, a felony
of the second degree, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-501
(1953 as amended).
1990.

Appellant was found guilty by a jury on May 8,

He was sentenced on June 20, 1990 to one term of 5 years tp

life in prison and two terms of 1 to 15 years in prison.

The Notice

of Appeal was filed on July 17, 1990.
4.

The facts pertinent to this appeal are as follows:

On January 9, 1989, Gilbert Lisonbee, an 85-year-old man,
was killed in his home on 2636 Green St., Salt Lake City, Utah. His
body was found by his girlfriend, Mary Timmins, and his next-door
neighbor, Marc Beal.

Mr. Lisonbee's home was in great disarray;

many of his household items were broken, knocked over, and out of
their usual locations.

In addition, blood was found in various

places around the house.

The police were called and Det. Jerry

Mendez, among others, arrived on the scene.

Det. Mendez was

assigned to be the case manager and he and another detective
immediately began to gather evidence at the scene. Throughout the
investigation of the case, Det. Mendez was intimately involved in|
the case, performing many of the tasks, including witness
interviews, himself.

A very large kitchen-type knife with blood on

the blade was recovered by police in the kitchen. A large wrench
with blood on both the head and handle was recovered in the bathroom.
After performing an autopsy on the body of Mr. Lisonbee,
the medical examiner concluded that he was killed by blows to the
head by a blunt object; he also concluded that at least some of
these blows were inflicted by a wrench of the size and type found in
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the bathroom of the Lisonbee home.
Later, police learned that at approximately noon on
January 9, 1989, Appellant, Fredrick Joseph Germonto, had attempted
to cash a check for $273.00 drawn on Mr. Lisonbee's account at Ye
Olde Town Pub; he was unsuccessful.

Police also learned that

shortly after noon, Appellant made another unsuccessful attempt to
cash that check at Check Mart.

Finally, police learned, Appellant

was able to cash the $273.00 check at Valley Bank and Trust Company
at approximately 2:45 p.m.
Upon further investigation, police later learned that, oh
January 9, 1989, Appellant arrived at the apartment of friends and
asked to shower and get a ride to the bus station.

The friends

noticed Appellant had a long, deep, straight cut on the palm of his
left hand.

They also noticed he was wearing a diamond ring he had

not previously worn, and that he appeared somewhat nervous.
Appellant also insisted he be driven to the bus station in Provo
rather than the one in Salt Lake City.

He left the clothes he had

been wearing in his friends7 apartment after showering; the clothes
were eventually turned over to the police.
Later analysis of various items of evidence by a serologist
at the Utah State Crime Lab revealed that on the head of the wrench
recovered at the Lisonbee house was blood consistent with
Mr. Lisonbee's blood; it was also determined that the blood on the
wrench handle was consistent with Appellant's. The serologist also
found that blood in two separate places on Appellant's pants was
consistent with Mr. Lisonbee's in one spot and with Appellant's in
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another.
At trial, Appellant testified that he was at Mr. Lisonbee's
house on January 9, 1989 to find out if Lisonbee had an apartment
Appellant could rent. Appellant had met Lisonbee a few days earlier
when he shoveled snow for him; at that time he had learned that
Lisonbee owned rental property.
While discussing the matter, Appellant noticed that
Lisonbee's toilet was running and that tools were near the toilet as
if someone had been attempting to repair it. Appellant offered to
work on it while Lisonbee made a phone call.
As Appellant was just finishing the repair job, Lisonbee
stood in the bathroom doorway and asked if Appellant was "on drugs";
having injected what he believed was amphetamines before arriving at
Lisonbee7s house, Appellant answered that he had taken some speed.
When he turned to look at Lisonbee after making the statement, he
saw that Lisonbee was no longer in the doorway.
Concerned that Mr. Lisonbee would be frightened, Appellant
went into the kitchen to find Lisonbee and talk to him.

When

entering the kitchen, Appellant was confronted by Lisonbee wielding
a very large knife. Appellant began telling Mr. Lisonbee he would
leave and that he just needed to go past Lisonbee to get his jacket,
but Lisonbee was screaming at Appellant.

Appellant tried to gently

push the knife aside, but he was cut on the hand with the knife.
Then Lisonbee pushed Appellant down onto the floor; as Appellant
arose, Lisonbee approached again with the knife.
Appellant recalls that, at that moment, he raised the
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wrench he still had in his hand towards Mr. Lisonbee, but could not
recall the next few minutes. He recalls that, some time later, he
was in the living room with the wrench in his hand, blood all over
himself, the house in disarray, and Mr. Lisonbee lying motionless on
the floor. Although he didn't specifically recall doing it, he knew
he must have killed Mr. Lisonbee, and he panicked.

His only thought

was that he had to get out of town, so he grabbed Lisonbee's
checkbook and ring which were nearby and left the house. He later
was able to cash a check, get a ride to the bus station, and leave
Utah on the bus.
Appellant was charged initially in two separate cases. In
one case, Appellant was charged with a single count of Forgery; in
the second case, Appellant was charged with one count of Criminal
Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree, and a second count charged in
the alternative as Robbery or Burglary.
Prior to trial, Appellant filed several motions, including
a Motion to Elect in which Appellant moved the court to require the
State to elect between the alternative counts of Robbery or
Burglary; that motion was denied by the court.
Also prior to trial, the State filed motions; among those
motions were a Motion to Join in which the State requested that the
two Informations be joined into one Information and be tried in a
single trial. That motion was granted over Appellant's objection.
Appellant later filed a Motion to Sever; that motion was denied.
The State also moved the court to allow Det. Mendez, the
detective in charge of the case and also a witness, to remain at the
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prosecution's table throughout the trial; over Appellant's
objection, the court granted that motion by the State.
During cross-examination of Appellant, the prosecutor asked
Appellant about his consultations with his attorneys and then argued
the same in his closing argument.
5.

The following issues will be presented on appeal:
A.

The trial court erred in denying

Appellant's Motion to Sever.
B.

The trial court erred in denying

Appellant's Motion to Elect.
C.

The trial court erred in allowing

witness Det. Mendez to remain in the courtroom
during the trial.
D.

The prosecutor's questions and arguments

to the jury about Appellant's consultations with his
attorneys was prosecutorial misconduct.
E.

The trial court erred in giving the

State's proposed jury instruction, over Appellant's
objection, regarding the victim's right of defense
of habitation.
6.

The Utah Supreme Court should decide this appeal,

rather than the Court of Appeals, because of the seriousness of the
convictions against Appellant and the maximum penalties imposed
against him by the trial court.
7.

The following statutes, case law and constitutional

requirements are relevant to the issues presented:
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Amendments V, VI and XIV, Constitution of the United
States;
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (1953 as amended);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-9 (1953 as amended);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-405 (1953 as amended);
Rule 615, Utah Rules of Evidence.

8.

There have been no related or prior appeals in this

matter.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

^

day of September, 1990

E. CLARK DONALDSON

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, LISA J. REMAL, hereby certify that a copy of the
foregoing Docketing Statement will be delivered to the Attorney
General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114,
this

vfl

day of September, 1990.

ftt'O],fanf
LISA J. feEMAL
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I,

, delivered a copy of

the foregoing to the Attorney General's Office this
September, 1990.
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Associate dHjicf Justtc*
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(Clerk
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Justice

August 27,1990

Ms. Lisa J. Remal
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:
No.

State v. Germonto
900375

Dear Ms. Remal:
The docketing statement you have filed with this court pursuant to rule 9 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure is deficient in the following particulars under
subparagraph (c):
4.

Statement of facts is missing or does not bear on questions
presented:
Facts stated are not material to issues raised, but address
procedural facts only. The Court needs the facts
surrounding the crimes charged, in order to assess the issues
of severance, election, and presence of witness.

6.

Language "Subject to assignment to the Court of Appeals" is
missing.

7.

Reasons for Supreme Court retention, if any, are not stated.

The docketing statement in its present form is rejected. Please amend it,
supplying information as indicated witliin ten days from the date of this letter, or your
appeal will be dismissed under rule 9(f) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
Very truly yours,

/Ctt/j^e

""/- ^

Antje if. Curry
Central Staff Attorney

AFC:s

Third Judicial District

JUL 1 7 1990
SALTUKE C O U ^

LISA J .

REMAL, # 2 7 2 2

By

—
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oeputyCierk

L. CLARK DONALDSON, #4822
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

NOTICE OF APPEAL

:

v.

:

FREDRICK JOSEPH GERMONTO,

:

Case No. 891900948

:

HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO

Defendant/Appellant.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that FREDRICK JOSEPH GERMONTO,
Defendant/Appellant in the above-entitled action, hereby appeals to
the Utah Supreme Court from the final judgment and conviction
rendered against him on the 21st day of June, 1990 by the Honorable
Raymond S. Uno, Judge, Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah.

DATED t h i s

jfit

day o f J u l y ,

1990.

ifavM- Ktr^J
LISA J J REMAL

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

L. CLARK DONALDSON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

DELIVERED/MAILED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake
County Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111; CECILEE WILSON, Court Reporter, Metropolitan Hall of Justice,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; and the Attorney General's Office, 236
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this fl
1990.

- 2-

day of July,

LISA J- REMAL, #2722
L. CLARK DONALDSON, #4822
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City# Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

AFFIDAVIT OF IMPECUNIOSITY

:

v.

:

FREDRICK JOSEPH GERMONTO,

:

Case No. 891900948

:

HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO

Defendant/Appellant.

I, FREDRICK JOSEPH GERMONTO, being first duly sworn
according to law on my oath, depose and say:
1.

I am the defendant in the above-entitled case.

2.

I am unable because of my poverty to pay the costs of

this case or to give security therefor because I am indigent.
3.

I believe in good faith that I am entitled to the

relief I am seeking.

DATED t h i s

<?

day o f J u l y ,

1990.

JDRICK JOS^PHpERMONTO
fefendant/Appellant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

4

day of July,

1990.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in Salt Lake City, Utah
My Commission Expires:

SatlUfctO^. Utah 54111 \
| ^N3E*X^
LJ^^TMM

Novembarl.llS
Stateo

M >

^wah

|

J

DELIVERED/MAILED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake
County Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111; CECILEE WILSON, Court Reporter, Metropolitan Hall of Justice,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; and the Attorney General's Office, 236
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this
1990.

day of July,

fl
It
DELIVERED BY
JUL 17 1990
JOEYRNQCCHIO

RL£2S!5TmS7C023T

LISA J. REMAL, #2722
L. CLARK DONALDSON, #4822
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

Third Judicial District

JUL 0 5 1990

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

ORDER

:

v.

:

FREDRICK JOSEPH GERMONTO,

:

Case No- 891900948

:

HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO

Defendant/Appellant.

Upon motion of LISA J. REMAL and L- CLARK DONALDSON,
attorneys for the above-named Defendant/Appellant, and good cause
showing;

I
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Salt Lake County, State of Utah

bear the cost of transcript preparation of the following hearing(s)
before the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Third District Court Judge, as
requested in the Designation of Record heretofore filed in the
above-entitled case:
10/23/89

Hearing on various motions

5/1-4/90
& 5/8/90

Trial (including voir dire/jury
selection, opening statements, trial,
and closing arguments)

DATED this O

^m

day of July, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE RAYMOND'S. UNO
Third District Court

DELIVERED/MAILED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake
County Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111; CECILEE WILSON, Court Reporter, Metropolitan Hall of Justice,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; and the Attorney General's Office, 236
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this

day of July,

1990.

1

H>

DELIVERED BY
JOEY Fif^CCCHiO

?

-

2 -

LISA J. REMAL, #2722
L. CLARK DONALDSON, #4822
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 South 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

DESIGNATION OF RECORD

:

v.

:

FREDRICK JOSEPH GERMONTO,

:

Case No. 891900948

:

HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO

Defendant/Appellant.

TO THE CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY:
You are hereby requested to prepare, certify and transmit
to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, with reference to the
Notice of Appeal heretofore filed in this case, all documents
contained in the file in the above-entitled matter together with the
transcript(s) of the following hearing(s) before the Honorable
Raymond S. Uno, Judge, Third Judicial District Court:
10/23/89

Hearing on various motions

5/1-4/90
& 5/8/90

Trial (including voir dire/jury
selection, opening statements, trial,
and closing arguments)

DATED this M-kL day of July, 1990.

t&L
LISA J.
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CLARK DONALDSON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

DELIVERED/MAILED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake
County Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111; CECILEE WILSON, Court Reporter, Metropolitan Hall of Justice,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; and the Attorney General's Office, 236
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this

day of July,

1990.

;5J VfEPFP> R v

JUL 3 7 1990
JCEYF:\"CCC:-TO
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LISA J. REMAL, #2722
L. CLARK DONALDSON, #4822
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

CERTIFICATE

:

v*

:

FREDRICK JOSEPH GERMONTO,

:

Case No. 891900948

:

HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO

Defendant/Appellant•

TO THE CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY:
With reference to the Designation of Record heretofore
filed by the Defendant/Appellant in the above case, Defendant/
Appellant hereby certifies that the transcript(s) of the following
hearing(s) before the Honorable Raymond S* Uno, Third District Court
Judge, has(have) been ordered in the above-entitled matter:
10/23/89

Hearing on various motions

5/1-4/90
& 5/8/90

Trial (including voir dire/jury
selection, opening statements, trial,
and closing arguments)

DATED t&is

fill

day of July, 1990.

fluvfci
WJ
LISA jyREMAL
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

L. CLARK DONALI
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

DELIVERED/MAILED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake
County Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111; CECILEEtflLSON,Court Reporter, Metropolitan Hall of Justice,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; and the Attorney General's Office, 236
State Capitol, £alt Lake City, Utah 84114, this

day of July,

1990.

:; r zz—^z — ~ v

JUL 17 1SS0
I'-c! r!i\s.wvir..U
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LISA J. REMAL, #2722
L. CLARK DONALDSON, #4822
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT

:

v.

:

FREDRICK JOSEPH GERMONTO,

:

Case No. 891900948

:

HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO

Defendant/Appellant.

TO THE COURT REPORTER OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY:
Pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule
11(e) (1) and (4), you are hereby requested to prepare, certify and
transmit to the Utah Supreme Court the original transcript(s) of the
following hearing(s) before the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Third
District Court Judge:
10/23/89

Hearing on various motions

5/1-4/90
& 5/8/90

Trial (including voir dire/jury
selection, opening statements, trial,
and closing arguments)

DATED this IH&

day of July, 1990.

LISA J^
Attorney for Defondant/Appellant

/L. CLARK DONALDSON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

DELIVERED/MAILED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake
County Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111; CECILEE WILSON, Court Reporter, Metropolitan Hall of Justice,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; and the Attorney General's Office, 236
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this

day of July,

1990.

JUL 1? teSQ
•-^ ' ;r*Y ^ '"* *"'jro
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IN THE THffiD~JTJUICIALUIi>IHIUI COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

Plaintiff.

c^AfMz/A.y, ^zmfopfc
/iJuf ,

77
Defendant.

89/7M9M

Case No.
Count No
Honorable

Clerk
Reporter
Bailiff
Date

. to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
D The motion of.
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
ur
he
should
not be
be imposed,
imposed, and
and defendant
defendant hayjng^een^ponyicted
ould not
hawigpeen^ponyicti j j y ^ a J YlP * court; Q plea of guilty;

sttdi&i
, a felony
• plea o f r m contest; of the offense of
{pAitf^^tyU
)
nd rea<
ready for sentence and
ss * misdemeanor, being now presen
esentin court*ind
of the / T . degree?p
£^f4Cand the State being represented by^te^^a^rnow adjudged guilty
represented by^
of the above orfenfee, is nbw sentenced to a term in the Utah State
tate Prison:
O to a maximum mandatory term of
years and which may be for life;
D not to exceed five years;
D of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
of not less than five years and which may be for life;
(o~S^^ ~S O ~^-Gn

a\5HRoi

§

not to exceed
years;
X and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $/Q}QQO<fiQ\
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount
O suclrsenterrce is to run uunuuirently
co
with
T^
_^
fesuGh ocfltonco ia la irun
D upon motion of Q^tate, m
D rw~««~
Defense, na ^ o u r t ? Count(s)

*
,
i^AlC^CJ4^f^^
y^

^

y,

_ ^ , , - _^

are hereby d i s m i s s e d . ^ f j * ^

D Defendant is granted a slay of the a#ove (D prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Aduft
Parole for the period of
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
^[^Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County)s(for delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or a for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance witb thi^Judgment and Commitment.
^ C o m m i t m e n t shall issueQZ^^^//^^L2
DATED t h i s ~ > /
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Defense Counsel

Deoutv Countv Attorney

Paae

z

^

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH.
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

Plaintiff,
Case No.
Count No
Honorabl
Clerk
Reporter
Bailiff
Date

vs.

V

Defendant.

tylffitfW

. to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
D The motion of.
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant haArtna been convicted b y ^ a jury; D the court; Q plea of guilty;
D plea of no contest; of the offense of V^MA^/I^J^
, a felony
of t h e ^ S i t degrea p a ctess
misdemeanor, oeing now presenU^ courtond ready for sentence and
represented hyj&44_ wstoA/ant\ the State being represented h y t ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ f e g ^ i ^ n n w adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is how sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
D to a maximum mandatory term of
years and which may be for life;
D not to exceed five years;
)s£of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
O of not less than five years and which may be for life;
a not to exceed
years;
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $
Q and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $_
.to.
^ s u c h sentence is to run concurrently with C W C
Q such sentence is to run consecutively with
upon motion of D State, D Defense, Q Court, Count(s)

TILare hereby dismissed.

Defendant is granted a stay of the above (D prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
^g^Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake Count^g^for delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or a for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance with/thi? Judgment and Commitment.
f^ Commitment shall issue
^^jnftA&lty
DATED this - > /

, day of

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Defense Counsel

Deputy County Attorney

Do/ia

>^V

/**

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

Plaintiff.

Case No.
Count No.
&
Honorable
Clerk
Reporter
Bailiff
^ ^
Date .

vs.

17

Defendant.

17

A9/?oo?V$

^

'

V

/

^

. to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
D The motion of.
impose sentence accordingly is • granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by ]S^a jury; a the court; a plea of guilty;
D plea of no contest; of the offense of ^ r ^ c ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
. a felony
of the<5^22r£degre^ p aojass
misdemeanorweii^g'now presentj n court^nd ready for sentence and
represented h u ^ ^ ^ ^ g ^ f e / / ^ n H the State being represented by ^ ^ ^ b l ^ 2 6 2 ? ^ l T O w adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is how sentenced to a term in the Utah State PrisD to a maximum mandatory term of
. years and which may be for life;
D not to exceed five years;
^ C o f not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
D of not less than five years and which may be for life;
D not to exceed
years;
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $.
.to
^fe^such sentence is to run concurrently with
D such sentence is to run consecutively with
D upon motion of a State, a Defense, D Court, Count(s)
are hereby dismissed.
D
D Defendant is granted a stay of the above (D prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County)stfor delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or a for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where oefendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
Trf Commitment shall issue
\jrrf7wM/Mn

X

is
DATED this
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Defense Counsel

2 ^day of

O^-^

;,,92£

